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Keeping Hope Alive
David Millon∗
These are hard times for organized labor. Once a hallmark of the
American industrial landscape, union membership has declined steadily in
recent decades. In the aftermath of World War II, over a third of all
American workers belonged to labor unions.1 By 1980, membership had
fallen to approximately 23%,2 and the number has decreased since then,
seeming to shrink further each time one looks into it. Today under 7% of
the private sector workforce is unionized.3 Public opinion of labor unions is
at an all-time low.4
The reasons for the decline of union membership are complex.5
Growth in service and technology industries and shrinkage in
manufacturing as jobs have moved overseas find more and more workers in
sectors in which unions have traditionally been relatively weak. Other
economic changes have brought more women, young people, members of
racial and ethnic minority groups, and part-timers into the workforce, all
populations that historically have been less interested in union membership.
In addition, much job growth has occurred in areas of the United States that
historically have been resistant to unionization. A strong economy, marked
by low unemployment, during the later 1990s and early years of the new
century further reduced the demand for unionization. And, as membership
has declined along with public views about unions, large corporations have
been increasingly willing to resist efforts to organize.
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All of this has happened against the backdrop of accelerating
economic disparities. Income inequality in this country is at its highest
levels since the 1930s. As of 2007, close to 50% of the nation’s income
went to the top 10% of households,6 with the richest 1% of Americans now
taking home 24% of the total.7 These numbers are the culmination of a
trend that began around 1980.8 From 1980 to 2005, a period of remarkable
economic growth, over 80% of this increase went to the wealthiest 1% of
the population.9 Meanwhile, real wages for middle- and lower-income
earners remained essentially stagnant.
The decline in union membership does not itself explain these
alarming developments, but it certainly hasn’t helped. Whether workers are
able to join labor unions remains an important issue. Unionization can
mean greater bargaining power, which in turn can yield better wages,
benefits, and working conditions. Unionized workers are thought to earn
on average approximately 15% more than their nonunionized
counterparts.10 They are also much more likely to enjoy defined-benefit (as
opposed to defined-contribution) pension plans.11 Of course, all this means
higher costs for business, and with so much at stake resistance to
unionization becomes a standard business practice in many industries.
A principal battleground is the legal distinction between "employees"
and "independent contractors." The right to organize under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is limited to employees.12 Potential tort
liability, withholding and employment tax expenses, workers’
compensation, and other legal issues are also implicated.
Large
corporations thus have strong incentives to structure employment relations
in ways that avoid employee status in favor of independent contractor
status. Not surprisingly, their efforts have given rise to substantial
litigation.

6. Steven Pearlstein, The Costs of Rising Economic Inequality, WASH. P OST, Oct. 6,
2010, at A13.
7. Timothy Noah, The Great Divergence, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/id/2266025/entry/2266026 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 1088 (14th ed. 2006).
11. Surowiecki, supra note 4, at 24.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (defining the term "employee" and listing
categories of workers excluded from the NLRA’s coverage).
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Under the NLRA, the classification question is generally determined
according to common law principles as expressed in the Restatement of
Agency. The central question has traditionally been the employer’s right of
control over the worker, but the Restatement explains the law in more
elaborate terms. Its test takes the form of a list of ten factors.13 However, it
doesn’t indicate which are more important or how they should be weighted
and, furthermore, the list is said to be nonexhaustive.14 The result is a legal
standard that is often vague and indeterminate. Sometimes the answers are
clear—some workers obviously qualify as employees while others
obviously do not—but there is a large gray area consisting of employment
relationships some of whose features seem to fall in one category and others
in the other. The National Labor Relations Board and the courts thus are
forced to work through these cases one at a time. The decisions often have
an ad hoc flavor and many of them have been bad for organized labor.
In his excellent Note,15 Micah Jost explains this confused area of the
law clearly and thoroughly. Against this backdrop he then focuses on the
recent FedEx Home Delivery case16 and exposes with devastating effect the
D.C. Circuit’s flawed reasoning. FedEx had long attempted to achieve
independent contractor classification for its delivery drivers. The standard
contract at issue in the case gave each individual driver the freedom to
organize his or her work as an independent business, potentially managing
several routes, owning several trucks, hiring drivers to work as employees,
and enjoying the right to sell routes without permission from FedEx. Some
FedEx drivers actually chose to organize their work in this way but many
did not. The latter, being subject to FedEx’s control, looked like employees
and as such presumably would ordinarily enjoy the right to join a union.
The D.C. Circuit, relying on its own recent decision,17 held otherwise. As
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
AGENCY]. The IRS has developed an even more elaborate twenty-factor test. Rev. Rul.
87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. More recently, it has identified three broad categories of evidence
that may be relevant to a particular case. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR OR EMPLOYEE? TRAINING MATERIALS,
TRAINING 3320-102 (10-96) TPDS 84238I, at 2–7 (1996).
14. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 13, § 220(2) (noting that the listed
factors are to be considered "among others").
15. Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Independent Contractors, Employees, and
Entrepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker
Approach, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2011).
16. See generally FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
17. See generally Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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372

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369 (2011)

in its prior decision, the court again rejected the common law’s traditional
focus on the right of control as a key indicator of employee status. Even
though many of the FedEx drivers had chosen not to pursue the opportunity
to structure their work in the form of independent businesses, the court held
that entrepreneurial potential offered to all drivers rather than the realities
of the actual relationships between the drivers and FedEx should be
determinative. Therefore, all the drivers were deemed to be independent
contractors, even though there was no question that many of them appeared
to be employees under traditional, long-established principles of agency
law.
When the law is vague and the stakes are high and you read a decision
that seems not to make sense, you may be tempted to say, "This isn’t law,
it’s just politics. It’s just the judges letting their personal political
preferences influence their judgment." It might be especially tempting to
dismiss an opinion in this way when labor law is involved: After all,
everyone has strong views about unions one way or the other. So, you say
further, "Maybe cases like this are just part of the general legislative and
judicial campaign against organized labor that has been going on for over
half a century." Veteran observers of this history may find themselves
especially prone to respond in this cynical manner.
The most impressive thing about Jost’s Note is his refusal to succumb
to this kind of cynicism. He takes the legal analysis very seriously and
carefully reveals how the analysis doesn’t make sense according to its own
logic. He then proposes a compelling, carefully thought out alternative
approach to the problem. He levels two powerful critiques of the FedEx
case. First, he faults the court for applying the law—and revising it, as in
FedEx and the recent case relied on by the court in that decision—with
explicit disregard for the policies underlying the labor laws. These include,
according to the NLRA, redress of "inequality of bargaining power" by
"encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection."18 An interpretation of the law restricting
opportunities to organize that is not compelled by statutory text or
precedent will inevitably appear to be arbitrary if it ignores labor law’s
fundamental policies.

18. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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Second, Jost levels a penetrating critique of the court’s own logic in
the FedEx case. He acknowledges the potential superiority of a test that
takes entrepreneurialism into account in comparison to the traditional
control test, in at least some cases. However, he explains why
entrepreneurial potential should not itself be enough to deny opportunities
for collective bargaining. Not all the drivers act as business owners, even
though all have the right to do so, and, importantly, many will never choose
to do so. This is due to the psychological fact that many people prefer the
stability and security of employee status over the responsibilities, risks, and
less certain (though potentially greater) rewards of business ownership. At
the same time, those who prefer employee status lack the bargaining power
to negotiate an alternative to the one-size-fits-all entrepreneurial
opportunity contract. In short, Jost reveals how the legal standard is being
applied in ways that defy its own logic, based on a sophisticated and
insightful understanding of the economic and psychological realities of
entrepreneurship.
Accordingly, Jost argues, actual rather than potential exercise of
entrepreneurial opportunities provided by the employer should be the key to
determining who enjoys statutory rights under the labor laws. This should
be determined on a worker-by-worker basis.
Jost’s critical analysis of the FedEx case exemplifies the best kind of
lawyer’s argument. He takes the court’s reasoning seriously, looks
carefully at the facts, the law, and the policy questions that are at stake, and
then explains clearly and persuasively the errors in the court’s analysis. His
proposal for reform is thorough and effectively addresses potential
objections.
In a time of conservative ascendancy, it can be hard for people of a
progressive bent—especially those of us who have been around for a
while—to continue to have faith in law as a vehicle for social justice,
especially with regard to the worsening inequalities of wealth and income.
Sometimes it seems that the political forces—and their economic
advantages—are too powerful. Even so, Jost reminds us that important
battles are still being fought in the courts, where legal argument supplies
the primary weapons. Jost’s Note is a brilliant example of how top-quality
legal argument might actually make a difference in people’s lives. As such
it should serve as an inspiration for all who seek social justice.

